T he recent controversy over research into mutated versions of the H5N1 flu virus has focused on biosecurity concerns. It is easy to get the impression that this debate has created a clear split between a scientific community that wants the research to proceed and the results to be published and a biosecurity community that doesn't.
outset and implement a full biosafety and biosecurity plan. Major efforts have been made in this area. But to deny funding to projects with clear scientific or public-health value, even if they have some biosecurity risks, will drive research to undesirable sources of funding and prevent valuable research from being done.
If the knowledge and the science cannot be contained, then what about access to the materials and equipment required to turn research results into weapons? The direction in which technology and scientific services are heading does not bode well for controlling proliferation in this way. Companies already make genes for mail order. Free genedesign software exists. DNA printers will probably be on lab bench tops within the decade. But it cannot be morally or politically defensible to prevent wide distribution of tools that are indispensable to public health and basic research.
Warfare and terrorism are not the only biological risks that confront humanity. There is an entire spectrum of risks, from natural and accidental to deliberate. We are mostly helpless to prevent the periodic creation of new deadly diseases. We know that we face regular flu pandemics and that some will be particularly deadly. An analysis of the effect of carrying out and publishing such research must compare two factors. The first -the cost -is the risk that publication will lead to deliberate release, multiplied by the impact of the release, multiplied by the frequency of release. The second -the benefit -is the possible reduction in the 250,000-500, 000 annual deaths worldwide due to seasonal flu and the more than 12 million lives lost annually to other infectious diseases, among other public-health benefits.
Precise calculation is not possible, but the evidence strongly suggests that the increase in risk is quite small. The known benefits of addressing public-health challenges from nature will almost always far outweigh the potential and unknowable increased risk of misuse.
The bigger argument in favour of continued research into viral transmissibility and pathogenicity (the focus of the mutant-flu work) is that it will ultimately deter the use of biological weapons.
The best strategy to stop biological attacks is to make biological weapons unattractive by making preparedness and responses so effective that the consequences are no worse than those of a train wreck. Increased understanding of transmissibility and pathogenicity will enable countries to identify threats earlier, develop better vaccines, produce them more quickly and develop broad-spectrum defences to diseases. This will protect against both nature and warfare. ■ WORLD VIEWA personal take on events
Tim

